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There is a danger when we enshrine our heroes, when we lift them onto
pedestals and lay wreaths at their feet. We can, by the very process of elevat-
ing them, strain the connection between them and the palpable, fleshy, some-
times mean concerns of our lives. It would be a terrible shame to lose Lincoln
that way. To make him a celebration but not an instruction, a memory but not
a model, a legend but not a lesson.... [Lincoln] worked within the hard, some-
times discouraging, sometimes terrifying, limits of time and place and chance.
And by our so remembering, he can again begin to light our minds and move
our hearts.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Whether residing in Springfield, Illinois, where Abraham Lincoln
practiced law for over twenty years, Lincoln, Nebraska, or elsewhere,
one easily can revel in the memory of a person many consider to be
the finest President in the history of this nation.2 Some remember
Lincoln as the self-educated, hard-working, rail-splitting frontiersman
who, against all odds, was elected President of the United States.
Others think of Abraham Lincoln as the President who ended slav-
ery.3 Still more revere Lincoln for his role in saving the Union. These
descriptions, although arguably accurate, are woefully incomplete;
they presume that Lincoln's life became meaningful only upon his as-
sumption of the Presidency in 1861.
In fact, over the course of more than two decades before taking the
Oath of Office, Lincoln became known as one of the most able trial
lawyers in Illinois.4 His clients ranged from huge railroads,5 to local
citizens with small claims,6 to accused murderers.7 Lincoln worked in
the trenches, and as such had to make many difficult choices, some of
which many attorneys face even today.
1. Mario M. Cuomo, Abraham Lincoln and Our "Unfinished Work" in 1986 PA-
PERS OF THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN ASs'N 44.
2. See, e.g., Clinton Should Stick to Election Themes, USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 1993, at
15A (quoting John P. Sears as saying, "By far, the greatest president was Abra-
ham Lincoln."); see also DAN W. BANNISTER, LINCOLN AND THE COMMON LAW 1
(1992).
3. In fact, a great debate on this point rages amongst the public at large. For oppos-
ing perspectives on the issue of Lincoln's role in ending slavery, see Hans L.
Trefousse, Teach 13-Year-Olds Lincoln Freed Slaves, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1987, at
s.4 p.24 (letter to the editor)(arguing that Lincoln's role in ending slavery was
significant); see contra Joseph L. Whitney, Confederate Flag: Don't Tear it Down,
WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1988, at A22 (letter to the editor)(arguing that the Emanci-
pation Proclamation was a purely military measure, and had the South immedi-
ately surrendered thereafter, slavery might still exist in the U.S.).
4. See infra notes 109-15 and accompanying text. Lincoln also participated in well
over three hundred cases before the Supreme Court of Illinois. BANNISTER,
supra note 2, at 1.
5. JOHN P. FRANK, LINCOLN AS A LAWYER 25 (1961).
6. Id. at 39.
7. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
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One such decision that faced Lincoln was what to do when, during
the course of representing a client, he came to believe that his client
was in the wrong.8 Today lawyers can turn to detailed rules of profes-
sional responsibility to assist in resolving the dilemmas that arise in
the practice of law.9 The person we now know as "Honest Abe," how-
ever, had to make his decisions without the aid of intricate guidelines
on professional conduct.1o Those choices, made by a person regarded
so highly for his integrity, are instructive as to how the modern legal
profession could revise its expectations of attorneys who represent cli-
ents they believe are culpable.
Part II of this article briefly examines the formation of Lincoln's
reputation for honesty and integrity before he began his legal prac-
tice.'" Part II then explores Lincoln's philosophy regarding honesty in
the practice of law, and reviews historical accounts of the level of zeal
Lincoln exercised in representing clients he came to believe were cul-
pable.12 Next, Part III.A scrutinizes the zealous advocacy require-
ments of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct as they would have related to Lincoln's
representation of such clients.' 3 Part III.B then suggests rethinking
the philosophical underpinnings of the Model Code and Model Rules
approach to zealous advocacy in the adversarial process.14 Finally,
Part III.C posits possible alternatives to the current understanding of
zealous advocacy that would give today's attorneys the choice to con-
form their conduct more closely to Lincoln's personal resolution of the
issue.15
II. HISTORY
A. The Pre-Attorney Lincoln
Before endeavoring to examine Abraham Lincoln's character both
before and during his membership in the Illinois Bar, it must be said
that any effort to describe Lincoln is only as reliable as the biogra-
phers it cites. In fact, as one Lincoln scholar noted:
Many of the stories relating to cases supposed to have been tried by Mr.
Lincoln, which have been told by his biographers and others, cannot now be
8. See infra notes 31-63 and accompanying text.
9. Were Lincoln practicing in Illinois today, he could turn for guidance to the Illi-
nois Rules of Professional Conduct. See ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.1 et seq. (1990).
10. The American Bar Association adopted the first canons of legal ethics at its
thirty-first annual meeting on August 27, 1908. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CANONS OF PROFESsIONAL ETHIcs (1908).
11. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 22-63 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 64-108 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 109-39 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 140-66 and accompanying text.
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verified or disproved.... [Tihe records and files of cases, other than such as
found their way into the Supreme Court, contain nothing more than the for-
mal documents. There were in those days no stenographic reports of the pro-
ceedings, and accounts given after the lapse of years and solely from memory
are not always reliable, however honest the narrator may be.1 6
Hopefully, by relying on a diversity of sources, this article will succeed
in painting a picture of Lincoln the lawyer, if only in broad strokes.
No such portrait of Lincoln would be complete without briefly re-
ferring to the formation of his reputation for honesty. The great re-
nown Lincoln enjoyed for his integrity originated many years before
he began his illustrious career as an attorney. As one prominent biog-
rapher told it, Lincoln was quite unusual in that he acted honestly
even in his boyhood.17 As a young man when Lincoln worked tending
counter in a New Salem store, he walked six miles to return a six and
a quarter cents overpayment a customer made on a dry goods
purchase.18 Not to detract from his ability to keep shop, but on more
than one occasion Lincoln honorably went to great lengths to correct
errors he made in favor of the store.19
Within the small community in which he lived, Lincoln's reputa-
tion for honesty quickly spread.20 One commentator noted:
It is a significant fact that in a community where crime was virtually un-
known, where plain, straightforward dealing was assumed as a matter of
course, and credit was fearlessly asked and given, Lincoln won an enviable
reputation for integrity and honor.... [T]he fact is that "honest Abe" was a
tribute, not a nickname.2 1
Thus, the adage that "honesty is the best policy" was more than just a
cliche to young Lincoln-it was a way of life.
16. JOHN T. RICHARDS, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE LAWYER-STATESMAN 58-59 (1916).
17. 1 CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE PRAIRIE YEARS 50 (1926). Sandburg
wrote:
[Lincoln's stepmother] said Abe was truthful; when Tilda Johnston
leaped onto Abe's back to give him a scare on a lonely timber path, she
brought the big axman to the ground by pulling her hands against his
shoulders and pressing her knee into his backbone. The ax-blade cut her
ankle, and strips from Abe's shirt and Tilda's dress had to be used to stop
the blood. By then she was sobbing over what to tell her mother. On
Abe's advice she told her mother the whole truth.
Id.
18. Id, at 138.
19. Sandburg wrote of one such example when, "finding he weighed tea with a four-
ounce weight instead of an eight, [Lincoln] wrapped up another quarter of a
pound of tea, took a long walk and delivered to the woman the full order of tea
she had paid for." Id.
20. FREDERICK T. HILL, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 31 (1912).
21. Id
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B. Lincoln, Honesty, and the Law
1. The Best Policy...
Despite the oft repeated jokes about honest attorneys (or, rather,
the lack thereof),22 the high regard for Lincoln's character was not
lost upon his induction into the Bar.23 Lincoln, whose legal practice
researchers believe to have been the largest in Illinois at the time,24
remained true to his belief that people should be honest in all facets of
their lives.25 Lincoln himself, in noting the "vague popular belief that
lawyers are necessarily dishonest," argued in notes prepared for a law
lecture that attorneys should "resolve to be honest at all events," and
that "if in your own judgment you cannot be an honest lawyer, resolve
to be honest without being a lawyer. Choose some other occupation,
rather than one in the choosing of which you do, in advance, consent
to be a knave."26
Lincoln's philosophy regarding honesty in the practice of law tran-
scended mere words-it informed and guided his every action both in-
side and outside the courtroom. 27 When Lincoln believed that a
prospective client was seeking his representation to advance a false
claim or defense, Lincoln always would refuse the representation.28
22. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Comment, Lawyers and Professionalism: A Com-
mentary on the Report of the American Bar Association on Professionalism, 18
Loy. U. Ci. L.J. 1149, 1150 (1987); see also infra note 166.
23. 1 SANDBURG, supra note 17, at 327 ("[Lincoln's] reputation was spreading as a
man and lawyer of whom people said, 'He'll be fair and square.' "). For further
reference to jokes about the integrity of members of the legal profession, see in-
fra note 166 and accompanying text.
24. Herbert Mitgang, Document Search Shows Lincoln the Railsplitter was Polished
Lawyer, N.Y. TnEs, Feb. 15, 1993, at A12.
25. FRANK, supra note 5, at 4.
26. Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a Law Lecture, reprinted in FRANK, supra note 5, at
4.
27. In fact, one commentator went so far as to say that Lincoln "was honest, not out
of policy, but because it was literally impossible for him to be otherwise." Eman-
uel Hertz, Lincoln the Lawyer, N.Y. Tams, Feb. 7, 1937, at 57.
28. S.C. Parks, Lecture at the University of Michigan, in CHARLES W. MOORE, THE
CAREER OF A CouNTY LAWYER: ABRAHAM LINCOLN 25 (1910)(Judge Parks had a
sizeable law practice at the time Lincoln rode the circuit). This is not to say that
Lincoln only took cases when he was 100% sure that his client was being truth-
ful-he would have had no clients had that been the case. In fact, one commenta-
tor has gone so far as to say that:
Lincoln's honesty is robbed of all human quality by eulogists who pic-
ture him as a lawyer perversely honest who refused all cases where
there was the least doubt of his clients' innocence or question about their
integrity .... They endow him with god-like qualities while performing
the dry-as-dust functions of his profession ....
This is far from being a true picture of Lincoln the lawyer.
ALBERT A. WOLDmAN, LAWYER LINCOLN 186-87 (1936). As Cullom Davis, the Di-
rector and Senior Editor of the Lincon Legal Papers project noted, several docu-
ments discovered in Illinois courthouses demonstrate "Lincoln's energetic
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Those who anoint Lincoln as a God among mere mortals,29 however,
overlook a fascinating aspect of Lincoln's legal career. Like many at-
torneys, in mid-trial Lincoln sometimes formed the opinion that he
had erred in assessing a client's character.3 0 How Lincoln handled
these situations says much about Lincoln as a lawyer and a human
being, and as this article later will discuss, raises novel issues regard-
ing the nature of attorneys' professional responsibilities when repre-
senting clients in courtroom settings.
2. ... but Best for Whom?
As the following examples illustrate, Lincoln's honesty occasion-
ally came at the expense of his clients. Albert A. Woldman in his book
Lawyer Lincoln3' provided an in-depth examination of Lincoln's be-
havior in a murder trial, People v. Patterson.3 2 Woldman vividly set
the scene:
The case of People vs. Patterson was on trial in the Circuit Court of Cham-
paign County. The large white-walled courtroom of unpainted woodwork and
pine floors was crowded to capacity.... Patterson, the accused murderer, pale
as cellar-grown grass from long confinement in the county prison, huddled
shrinkingly in his chair. His eyes gazed blankly upon the floor. Now and then
he raised them and seeing the sheriff close by disconsolately let them fall
again to the floor.3 3
Lincoln, thinking Patterson was innocent, had agreed to represent
him with Leonard Swett and Henry C. Whitney.3 4 As the trial pro-
ceeded, however, the two State's attorneys prosecuting the case me-
representation of some pretty unsavory clients." Letter from Cullom Davis, Di-
rector and Senior Editor, The Lincoln Legal Papers: A Documentary History of
the Law Practice of Abraham Lincoln, 1836-1861 (on file with the NEB. L. REV.).
Perhaps Lincoln's representation of such clients did not suffer because he be-
lieved at the outset that those clients were guilty, and planned his defense accord-
ingly. Or, equally plausibly, perhaps Lincoln believed that those "unsavory"
clients in fact were innocent. Although court records cannot capture Lincoln's
behavior and mannerisms during trial, the efforts of those involved in compiling
the Lincoln Legal Papers surely will be invaluable in filling many blanks that
currently exist in the perception of Lincoln the lawyer. See Herbert Mitgang,
Newly Found Lincoln Files Show Wide Range of Early Legal Work, NEW YORK
TIMES, July 4, 1993, § 1, at 14. Interestingly, Mitgang reported that the Lincoln
Legal Papers staff recently discovered bills of indictment against Lincoln's clients
on which the name of the state's attorney was signed in Lincoln's handwritting.
That a criminal defense attorney would even consider doing such a thing is an
interesting comment on how attorney viewed the adversarial process in the mid-
1800's. For a further examination of that perspective, see infra note 106.
29. For further commentary on this phenomenon, see supra note 1 and accompany-
ing text.
30. See infra notes 31-63 and accompanying text.
31. ALBERT A. WOLDmAN, LAWYER LINCOLN (1936).
32. See Id. at 179-82.
33. Id. at 179.
34. Id.
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thodically put on evidence demonstrating the guilt of Patterson.3s
Lincoln, seriously doubting the innocence of his client, "appeared
gloomy and dejected. Judge Davis, presiding, observed that the enthu-
siasm and buoyancy which marked his friend's countenance at the be-
ginning of the trial was now gone."36
Lincoln, well known for his spirited defenses, was adrift without
moral force for his argument. As witnesses testified to the details of
the killing, motive, and intent, Lincoln's renowned skill at cross-ex-
amination caused great anticipation amongst those present.37 Much to
the surprise and chagrin of the audience, "[f]or the most part his cross-
examination of these witnesses was weak and spiritless. His lack of
fighting spirit was a mystery to the courthouse crowd. They craved
excitement, but the redoubtable Lincoln appeared submissive and des-
titute of enthusiasm or aggression."38 Thus proceeded the first two
days of the Patterson murder trial.
After the close of the second day of trial, Lincoln and Swett had a
candid discussion regarding the case in their hotel room. 39 Lincoln,
believing that he would injure Patterson's case by further participa-
tion in the trial, implored Swett to take Lincoln's place as lead coun-
sel.4 0 When Swett demurred, Lincoln stated, "'I am satisfied that our
client is guilty and that the witnesses for the State have told the truth.
It is my opinion that the best thing we can do for our client is to have
him plead guilty to the lowest punishment.' "41 Swett remained im-
movable on the point, and then Lincoln, Swett, and Whitney agreed
that Lincoln would give the closing argument.42
Lincoln's decision to give the closing argument resulted in disaster
for Patterson. Lincoln knew that his honesty, a trait that usually
brought him great success in trials, was the kiss of death when he be-
lieved his clients to be culpable.43 Woldman detailed the ensuing
events:
At length when it came time to argue the case to the jury, Swett, a very effec-
tive jury advocate, made a touching appeal for the acquittal of Patterson. De-
spite his protest, Lincoln was induced by his associates to make the closing
argument.
35. Id. Or, as Woldman more eloquently put it, "Orlando B. Ficklin and Ward H.
Lamon, the State's attorneys, called witness after witness to the stand and
adroitly wove a web of evidence which soon broke down the 'presumption of in-
nocence' which cloaked the prisoner." Id-
36. I&
37. Id- at 179-80.
38. I& at 180.
39. Id. at 180.
40. Id. at 181 (" 'Swett,' [Lincoln] said pleadingly, 'the man is guilty. You defend him.
I can't.' ").
41. Id-
42. Id- at 181-82.
43. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
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'His logically honest mind chilled his efforts,' Whitney believed. 'While he
made some good points, the honesty of his mental processes forced him into a
line of argument and admission that was very damaging.
Lincoln's feeble, spiritless defense was useless. As he had predicted, the
jury found Patterson guilty. Lincoln, Swett, and Whitney each received two
hundred dollars as a fee.4 4
Other biographers described the events surrounding the Patterson
case in essentially the same manner.4 5
Lincoln scholars also have described other courtroom conduct by
Lincoln similar to his behavior in Patterson. For example, Frederick
Hill reported that in another trial with Whitney,46 this time involving
a charge of manslaughter, Lincoln lost interest in the case after hear-
ing the prosecution witnesses' testimony.47 Lincoln was unable to de-
44. WOLDMAN, supra note 28, at 181-82 (footnote omitted). Some biographers have
claimed that Lincoln abandoned the case and took no fee after forming a belief in
Patterson's guilt, but John Duff, explained that error:
Thanks to Whitney, one of the myths put out by the early Lincoln
idolaters, concerning [the Patterson] case, was shown up for the
fabrication it was. "I have noticed in most of the 'Lives of Lincoln' which
have fallen under my notice," wrote Whitney, "this pretty story: that in
the case of Patterson, who was tried for murder in Urbana, Lincoln said
to Swett: 'The man's guilty-you defend him; I won't;' and Swett took
the whole fee, Lincoln refusing any part of it .... The facts are these: I
was the first lawyer employed in the case, and was instructed to employ
any one I deemed needful for the best defense. I accordingly wrote to
both Swett and Lincoln, and employed them. We each got $200.00, and
each kept what he got. Lincoln remained in the case till the end, making
the last speech."
JOHN J. DUFF, A. LINCOLN: PRAIRIE LAWYER 282-83 (1960), quoting HENRY C.
WHITNEY, LIFE ON THE CIRCUIT WITH LINCOLN (1940). Or, as Whitney again wrote:
I have mentioned a murder case in which he acted badly toward Swett
and I and his client, as I thought, but he did not abandon the case or
refrain from arguing it (though we would have let him off) or decline his
fee, but he simply argued very feebly and brought disaster to some of our
effective-but illegitimate-arguments. I note that Lamon and other bi-
ographers state that he declined his fee and wouldn't argue it. I know he
did argue it, and he and Swett and I, each got two hundred dollars.
WHITNEY, supra at 240.
45. See, e.g, Willard L. King, Lincoln the Lawyer, in LINCOLN FOR THE AGES 92
(Ralph G. Newman, ed. 1960). King concisely described the affair:
Another eminent quality of Lincoln's was his conscientiousness. He
was a poor lawyer in a case in which he did not believe .... The outstand-
ing example is the Patterson homicide case in Champaign, which Lin-
coln, with Swett and Whitney, was defending.... As the trial went on,
Lincoln became more and more convinced that his client was guilty.
Lincoln tried to beg off from making the closing argument, but his col-
leagues insisted. Afterward they agreed that he made a poor argument.
46. Whether this truly is a separate example is discussed infra at note 50.
47. HILL, supra note 20, at 237-38. Hill wrote:
Lincoln was not considered a formidable opponent in the criminal
courts, however, unless he thoroughly believed in the justice of his cause.
Mr. Whitney reports that on one occasion when he was defending a man
charged with manslaughter, the testimony demonstrated that his client
1212 [Vol. 72:1205
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liver an effective closing argument, and as a result his client was
convicted and imprisoned.48 Whitney, disturbed by the events, charac-
terized Lincoln's conduct as "atrocious." 49 Guilt-ridden, within a year
Lincoln petitioned for and received from the governor a pardon of his
client.5 0
ought to have been indicted for murder in the first degree, whereupon
Lincoln instantly lost all interest in the case. He did not actually aban-
don the defense, but he could not cooperate effectively with his associ-
ates, who were endeavoring to acquit the defendant, and one of them
states that when Lincoln addressed the jurors he disparaged the effort
which had been made to work upon their feelings and confined himself
to a strictly professional argument along conventional lines, with the re-
sult that the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to three years'
imprisonment. This fairly disgusted Mr. Whitney, who was anxious to
have the murderer acquitted, and he does not hesitate to characterize
Mr. Lincoln's conduct as "atrocious."
Id-
48. Id.
49. Id
50. 2 SANDBURG, supra note 17, at 48. Sandburg explained that:
Leonard Swett and Whitney had spoken for the defence, and believed
they would get a verdict of acquittal. Then Lincoln spoke to the jury,
took up the facts and the evidence, and was all of a sudden making argu-
ments and admissions that spoiled the case for the prisoner at the bar.
The jury came in with a verdict that sent the client to the penitentiary
for three years.
And the case got to working in Lincoln's mind. Somehow he hadn't
done just right. Having helped get the man in the penitentiary, he
worked to get him out, and in a year handed him a pardon from the
governor of the state.
Id
Whether the story outlined by Hill and Sandburg is distinct from the Patter-
son case is less than clear. The only explicit information available to this author
with regard to that question is the following passage from Woldman's biography:
In another murder case, Swett pleaded with the jury to acquit the
defendant because he was the father of several small children and his
wife was about to give birth to another. Whitney says that Lincoln too
adverted to the prisoner's family, 'but only to disparage it as an argu-
ment, saying that the proper place for such appeals was to a legislature
who framed laws, rather than to a jury who must decide upon evidence.
In point of fact, our client was found guilty and sent to the penitentiary
for three years; and Lincoln, whose merciless logic drove him into the
belief that the culprit was guilty of murder, had his humanity so
wrought upon that he induced the governor to pardon him after he had
served one year.'
WOLDmAN, supra note 28, at 183 (footnote omitted). Because this passage imme-
diately precedes Woldman's discussion of Patterson, see id. at 179-82, Woldman
clearly believed that the two cases were distinct. Admittedly, however, the two
cases share the similarities of being murder trials, having the same three co-coun-
sel, and Lincoln engaging in similar conduct during the trial. See supra notes 31-
45 and accompanying text. Because of the poor state of records available, unless
the Lincoln Legal Papers project or other historians discover new information on
this point, the real answer likely is lost to the ages. See Mitgang, supra note 24, at
A12.
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In fact, some commentators have noted that Lincoln sometimes en-
tirely would abandon cases in mid-trial.51 Carl Sandburg, who penned
an authoritative six-volume biography of Lincoln,5 2 referred to "three
or four [such] cases."5 3 Frederick Hill detailed one case in which,
when testimony unfolded that Lincoln's client had committed fraudu-
lent practices, Lincoln stormed out of court and refused to continue;
when the judge sent a messenger to fetch him, Lincoln told the mes-
senger to "[t]ell the judge that my hands are dirty and I've gone away
to wash them."54
Lincoln's peers illuminated the rationale for Lincoln's courtroom
conduct when he developed the belief that his clients were culpable.
Judge David Davis, whose knowledge of Lincoln's life as a lawyer was
second only to Lincoln's twenty-year partner William Herndon,55
stated that "[t]he frame-work of [Lincoln's] mental and moral being
was honesty, and a wrong cause was poorly defended by him. In order
to bring into full activities his great powers it was necessary that he
should be convinced of the right and justice of the matter which he
advocated."56 Whitney shared Judge Davis's perspective, contending
that "'[n]o man was stronger than [Lincoln] when on the right side,
and no man weaker when on the opposite.' "57 Judge Thomas Drum-
51. But see WHITNEY, supra note 44, at 241. Whitney noted:
I find, however, that biographers, in a gush of enthusiasm incline to
inculcate the idea that Lincoln was wont to retire from every case in
which he found himself to be wrong and to surrender up his fees, and to
try both sides of his cases. As it has been heretofore indicated, such is by
no means the case. In a clear case of dishonesty he would hedge in some
way so as to not, himself, partake of the dishonesty. In a doubtful case of
dishonesty, he would give his client the benefit of the doubt, and in an
ordinary case he would try the case, so far as he could, like any other
lawyer ....
Id. (emphasis added). Of course, as noted throughout Part II, Lincoln, when he
developed the belief that his client was culpable, simply could not try cases like
any other lawyer.
52. See SANDBURG, supra note 17; CARL SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINcOLN: THE WAR
YEARS (1926).
53. 2 SANDBURG, supra note 17, at 60.
54. HILL, supra note 20, at 239. Sandburg described the events similarly:
When a rapscallion claimed money was owing him and hired Lincoln to
prove it, the opposition lawyer brought in a receipt showing the money
had been paid. Lincoln left the courtroom and was sitting in the hotel
office with his feet on the stove when word came that he was wanted at
court. "Tell the judge," he said, "that I can't come; I have to wash my
hands."
2 SANDBURG, supra note 17 at 60-61.
55. See HILL, supra note 20, at 178.
56. REXFoRD NEWCOMB, IN THE LINCOLN COUNTRY 144 (1928).
57. WOLDMAN, supra note 28 at 181 (quoting Whitney). Whitney also stated:
[I]t was morally impossible for Lincoln to argue dishonestly; he could no
more do it than he could steal; it was the same thing to him, in essence,
to despoil a man of his property by larceny, or by illogical or flagitious
1214
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mond attributed Lincoln's lack of success in representing clients Lin-
coln believed were culpable to the "inward struggle" between loyalty
to his client and doing justice.58
Some of the most telling observations come from Lincoln's long-
time partner William Herndon. Herndon believed that "[t]wo things
were essential to [Lincoln's] success in managing a case. One was
time; the other a feeling of confidence in the justice of the cause he
represented.... But if either of these essentials were lacking, he was
the weakest man at the bar."59 Herndon also criticized Lincoln's "ex-
treme conscientiousness and disregard of the alleged professional
cloak," noting that a client retaining Lincoln as defense counsel "did
not prevent him from throwing it up in its most critical stage if he
believed he was espousing an unjust cause."60
Lincoln himself explained why his courtroom skills suffered when
he came to believe his clients were culpable. He explained that he
tried not to represent those with bad cases in equity and justice, re-
vealing that "I couldn't do it [win the case].... All the time while
standing talking to that jury I'd be thinking, 'Lincoln, you're a liar,'
reasoning: and even to defeat a suitor by technicalities or by merely ar-
bitrary law, savored strongly of dishonesty to him. He tolerated it some-
times, but always with a grimace.
WHrINEY, supra note 44, at 239. Further supporting the point, Whitney added:
Truth is polygonous, and the average mind can see only the nearest
side perfectly, the nearest oblique sides imperfectly, and the rear not at
all; but Lincoln possessed that kind of mental eyesight (if I may use that
expression) that saw all sides and angles of every moral proposition in-
herent in his law or politics, and hence he knew both sides; and if he
acted at all, must state his convictions to all whom it might concern, even
if it brought disaster to his side of the case.
Ic. at 239-40.
58. WOLDDMAN, supra note 28, at 183 (footnote omitted). Woldman quoted Judge
Drummond as saying:
Such was the transparent candor and integrity of his nature that he
could not well or strongly argue a side or a cause that he thought
wrong... Of course, he felt it his duty to say what could be said, and to
leave the decision to others; but there could be seen in such cases the
inward struggle of his own mind.
Id.
59. 2 Wniu_ H. HERNDON & JESSE W. WEIK, HERNDON'S LINCOLN: THE TRUE
STORY OF A GREAT LimE 337-38 (1890). For further confirmation of this point, see
S.C. Parks, Lecture at the University of Michigan, in MOORE, supra note 28, at 25
(Lincoln "was intellectually honest. He would not advocate a cause in which he
did not believe. He was the easiest lawyer to beat when he thought he was wrong
that I ever knew.").
60. 2 HERNDON & WEIK, supra note 59 at 326. Although Herndon believed that Lin-
coln's conduct, "robbed him of much so-called success at the bar," id., one should
not take Herndon's criticisms as a sign of disrespect for Lincoln's stature as an
attorney. Not only is the title of his book telling (Herndon's Lincoln: The True
Story of a Great Life), but Herndon went on to say that when his "righteous
indignation" was aroused in trial, "he was the most fearless man I ever knew."
Id. at 328.
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and I believe I should forget myself and say it out loud."61 Lincoln's
statement explains why "[w]hen on the right side of a case which
might enlist personal feeling, he was terrible as an army with banners;
but on the wrong side he was frequently an injury to his case." 62 Un-
like other lawyers of his time (and ours), Lincoln simply could not
argue effectively for a client he believed was culpable.63
III. THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IMPLICATIONS
OF LINCOLN'S CONDUCT
The usually complacent Lincoln appeared greatly perturbed. He had ac-
cepted a fee to defend Patterson. He had believed in the accused's innocence
and now he was firmly convinced the man was guilty. The discovery un-
nerved him.
What should he do? Abandon the case or go on with the defense? His
conscience bothered him. It cried out that the cause he was advocating was
contrary to justice. His duty, he felt, was loyalty to his client. But how far
must this fidelity go? He had entered upon the case and had learned the in-
nermost secrets of his client. Apparently Patterson had not told him all the
facts. And yet the accused murderer's liberty, perhaps his life, depended upon
the lawyer's faithfulness, his eloquence and skillful advocacy. Was the lawyer
honor-bound to stick by his client at all costs? Would it be right for him to
forsake the accused man now?
The question was indeed perplexing.6 4
61. WOLDMAN, supra note 28 at 181 (quoting Lincoln). One of Lincoln's associates
reported a very similar statement made by Lincoln.
Soon after beginning to practice, I was employed to defend a man
charged with larceny and Mr. Lincoln was employed to assist me. I re-
ally believed at the beginning of the trial that the man was not guilty.
But the evidence was unfavorable, and at its close Mr. Lincoln called me
into the consultation room and said: "If you can say anything that will do
our man any good, say it. I can't. If I say anything the jury will see that I
think he is guilty and will convict him."
Parks, supra note 28, at 25.
62. WHITNEY, supra note 44, at 231.
63. WOLDMAN, supra note 28, at 181. Woldman noted:
Swett, Whitney, and other lawyers of their circuit could argue a bad case
nearly as well as a good one. But not Lincoln. When his own conscience,
acting as judge and jury, determined the client's guilt, or told him that he
was on the wrong side of justice, he could not feign enthusiasm for the
cause. He could not argue the case and convince the jury to do that
which he himself felt was wrong.
Id Francis Browne quoted S.C. Parks in the same vein:
"IFlor a man who was for a quarter of a century both a lawyer and a
politician he was the most honest man I ever knew. He was not only
morally honest, but intellectually so. He could not reason falsely; if he
attempted it, he failed.... [W]hen he thought he was wrong, he was the
weakest lawyer I ever saw."
FRANcIs F. BROWNE, THE EVERY-DAY LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 144
(1914)(quoting S.C. Parks).
64. WOLDMAN, supra note 28 at 180.
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. The Principle of Zealous Advocacy in the Model Rules and the Model
Code
The above passage clarifies the difficult questions regarding zeal-
ous advocacy that faced Abraham Lincoln well over a century ago and
that still face lawyers today. Attorneys in the 1990s, however, have
more professional guidance than had those practicing in Lincoln's era.
In Lincoln's day, there were no written rules of professional conduct,
and in fact the first article written in the United States regarding the
principle of zealous advocacy was written in 1860, only slightly before
Lincoln ceased practicing law.65 Thus, the following exercise hardly
could be considered an affront to Lincoln; Lincoln probably was the
attorney most concerned with acting ethically in his time,66 and this
article has no intention of disparaging his memory (and, in fact, in-
tends quite the opposite).
Nevertheless, comparing Lincoln's conduct in defending clients he
believed to be culpable to the standards of zeal enumerated in the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility67 (Model Code) and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct68 (Model Rules) is a useful exer-
cise in analyzing the utility of those provisions. The Model Code ad-
dresses zealous representation generally in Canon 7 ("A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the
Law"),69 and specifically in DR 7-101, entitled "Representing a Client
Zealously." 70 DR 7-101(A)(1) requires that "[a] lawyer shall not inten-
tionally ... [f]ail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through
reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disciplinary
Rules ... "71
At best, DR 7-101 taken alone is imprecise. The inclusion of the
word "reasonably" raises the question of whether reasonably is an ob-
jective or subjective standard. EC 7-1 of the code informs on this point
in its provision that "[t]he duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to
the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds
of the law .... -72 A footnote to this provision further supports the
65. GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1860); see
CHARLES WOLFRAi, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 578 (1986).
66. See supra notes 31-63 and accompanying text.
67. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsBILITY (1981)(hereinafter MODEL
CODE).
68. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1991)(hereinafter MODEL
RULES).
69. MODEL CODE Canon 7.
70. Id at DR 7-101.
71. Id. at DR 7-101(A)(1)(footnotes omitted).
72. Id at EC 7-1 (footnote omitted). See also THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 23 (5th ed.
1991) ("One of the prime professional obligations of the Code is to iepresent [a]
client zealously within the bounds of the law [.... The lawyer must serve his or
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objective interpretation of "reasonably," quoting a federal district
court opinion that explained, "[W]hen defense counsel... admits that
his conscience would not permit him to adopt certain customary trial
procedures, this extends beyond the realm of judgment and strongly
suggests an invasion of constitutional rights."73
The Model Code clarifies this notion further in EC 7-19, which
points out that the duty of zealous advocacy is owed not just to the
client, but to the legal system as well.7 4 By zealously advocating their
clients' positions, attorneys enable judges and juries to render judg-
ment based on an analysis of the forceful arguments of both sides.75
Allowing attorneys subjectively to determine when certain means are
reasonable would undermine the systemic interest in a sound trial
process, and the Model Code therefore intends to impose upon attor-
neys an objective standard of zeal.76
One commentator nicely summarized this level of zeal prescribed
by the Model Code as consisting of two central ideas:
(i) Partisanship: the lawyer's sole allegiance is to the client. Within, but
all the way up to, the limits of the law, the lawyer is committed to the aggres-
sive and single-minded pursuit of the client's objectives.
(ii) Neutrality: once he has accepted the client's case, the lawyer must
represent the client, or pursue the client's objectives, regardless of the law-
yer's opinion of the client's character and reputation, and the moral merits of
the client's objectives. 7 7
Lincoln's pursuit of clients' interests was not single-minded, but
rather guided by his conscience, and was not neutral, as his opinion of
his client's character affected his representation. Were Lincoln prac-
ticing today, his conduct would be considered less than zealous under
the Model Code.
The same result would follow under the Model Rules. Rule 1.3 re-
quires that "[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and prompt-
ness in representing a client."78 Although the word "zeal" does not
appear in the actual rule,79 Comment 1 to Rule 1.3 notes that "[a] law-
yer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."80 Comment
her client well and still be professionally responsible.") (quoting MODEL CODE EC
7-1).
73. Id. at n.3, quoting Johns v. Smyth, 176 F. Supp. 949, 952 (E.D. Va. 1959). The
constitutional aspects of zealous advocacy are beyond the scope of this essay.
74. MODEL CODE EC 7-19.
75. Id.
76. See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
77. Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responisibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 63, 73 (1980).
78. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.3.
79. See id
80. Id at cmt. 1. The Model Rules omitted the word "zeal" from the text of Rule 1.3
for fear that it could be construed as "overzeal." Ronald D. Rotunda, Ethical
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1 adds the vague statement that "a lawyer is not bound to press for
every advantage that might be realized for a client,"81 but this provi-
sion should not be interpreted as departing from the requirement of
zealous representation. In simplifying the language of the Model
Code, Rule 1.3 was not intended to reduce the level of zeal required of
attorneys embroiled in adversarial proceedings, and Lincoln would
have no greater ease in arguing for a subjective standard of zeal under
the Model Rules.82
Thus, zeal is measured objectively-but what is zeal? Although
"zeal" is somewhat abstract taken in isolation, the philosophical un-
derpinnings of zealous advocacy help to clarify the term. Zealous ad-
vocacy in both the Model Code and Model Rules is grounded in the
notion of role differentiation,83 an idea that academicians have ex-
plained at length.8 4
Role differentiation is, as Charles Wolfram put it, when the same
person marches to the beat of different professional and personal
drunmers.85 According to this view, the requirement of zeal does not
dictate that attorneys agree on a moral level with what they advocate,
but rather that they advocate it to the best of their abilities.8 6 Other
Problems in Federal Agency Hiring for Private Attorney, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
85, 116-117 (1987).
81. Id.
82. WOLFRAM, supra note 65, at 578-79. See also MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDER-
STANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 72-73 (1990). Freedman wrote:
Despite the apparent depreciation of zealous representation in the
Model Rules, there is reason to hope that they will be interpreted to in-
clude the pervasive obligation of zealous representation that its drafters
scanted... [T]he Reporter to the Model Rules... has explained that
although "[tihe Model Rules contain no single Rule that explicitly posits
the lawyer's duty to the client in such sharp terms [as in DR 7-101] ....
the overall approach has not changed."
Id. (quoting GEOFFRY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
17 (1988 supp.)(emphasis in original)(footnote omitted).
83. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
85. WOLFRAM, supra note 65, at 584.
86. Linda E. Fisher, Truth as a Double-Edged Sword. Deception, Moral Paradox, and
the Ethics of Advocacy, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 89, 102 (1989); Postema, supra note 77,
at 73. See also STEPHEN GILLERS & NoRmAN DORSEN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
PROBLEMS OF LAw AND ETHICS 457 (1989). Gillers and Dorsen noted:
Many think of the advocate as amoral, and many advocates accept
this characterization. An advocate may concede that she means to win
all or as much as possible for her client, regardless of who is right. The
advocate may deny that it is possible to talk about "right." You are right
if you win; you don't win because you are right. The advocate may see
herself as an agent of the client in an artificial, highly structured combat
system called litigation. Her job is to use all available legal and ethical
means to achieve her client's goal, subject only to her client's willingness
and ability to pay the cost, which includes the advocates's fee. It matters
not that a particular strategy might encourage the "wrong" result, be-
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commentators have described role differentiation similarly, as the de-
cision to pursue a client's moral choices, rather than substituting the
attorney's personal morality, without actually abdicating the attor-
ney's own beliefs.87 Lawyers are viewed as "actors putting on the
transitory character and the moral stance required by their profes-
sional work and then readily shedding that role to walk away from it
and resume an integral life as a nonprofessional person in family, busi-
ness, and other personal roles."88 Although some commentators be-
lieve that zealous advocacy requires attorneys actually to become fully
emotionally committed to their clients' position,8 9 most believe that
the Model Code and Model Rules merely require detachment.90
But how does that detachment translate into the representation of
a client an attorney later comes to believe is culpable? Role differenti-
ation requires that once attorneys take cases, they must use their elo-
quence or other skills to defend their clients regardless of the
attorneys' personal beliefs relating to guilt or fault.91 Richard Wasser-
strom described this notion:
For what is probably the most familiar aspect of this role-differentiated char-
acter of the lawyer's activity is that of the defense of a client charged with a
crime. The received view within the profession ... is that having once agreed
to represent the client, the lawyer is under an obligation to do his or her best
to defend that person at trial, irrespective, for instance, even of the lawyer's
belief in the client's innocence.... [I]t is thought both appropriate and obliga-
tory for the attorney to put on as vigorous and persuasive a defense of a client
believed to be guilty as would have been mounted by the lawyer thoroughly
cause just as there is no "right," there is no "wrong," except by reference
to how the system resolves the issue.
Id-
87. Fisher, supra note 86, at 99. Even under the role differentiation perspective, an
attorney may not rely on every moral choice made by a client; lawyers are limited
by rules of professional conduct that trump the wishes of their clients. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES Rule 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous .... ").
88. WOLFRAM, supra note 65, at 584.
89. See Gray Thoron, A Course in the Dynamics of Professional Responsibility, in
EDUCATION IN THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 88, 95 (Don-
ald T. Weckstein ed., 1970). A major problem with this perspective, aside from
the practical difficulty of becoming so fully committed to a client's position, is
that it is emotionally schizophrenic. See WOLFRAM, supra note 65, at 585. In such
a case:
The lawyer's emotions are severed from the lawyer's consciousness.
Putting one's emotions out for hire to someone whose objectives the law-
yer despises is the sort of personal debasement that may predictably lead
to professional burnout and withdrawal and stagnation in law practice.
Or, if pressed, it may lead to profound moral skepticism, an utter insensi-
tivity to the human qualities of persons-clients and opponents alike.
I& These problems are not so distant from those caused by role differentiation.
See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
90. I. at 587.
91. WOLFRAM, supra note 82, at 587.
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convinced of the client's innocence. 92
But how can an attorney, who knows in her mind that her client is
culpable, justify continuing that representation without blindly basing
that decision on rules of professional conduct-rules that were un-
available in Lincoln's day?93
One possible answer to that question is that attorneys never really
know whether their clients are guilty or at fault.94 That knowledge is
gained only when a judge or jury renders the final decision in a case. 95
This epistemological justification, however, is unsatisfying to the prac-
ticing attorney. For instance, a lawyer never truly could "know"
whether her client intended to commit perjury, and the interests of
the judicial system would be subjugated to those of the client.9 6 In
fact, attorneys never would have sufficient "knowledge" to refuse a
client seeking representation, undermining the entire notion of attor-
neys screening potential clients.97 Finally, on a more personal level,
92. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN
RIGHTS 1, 6 (1975). Or, as put in a different context:
Now you're standing there tongue tied
You'd better learn your lesson well
Hide what you have to hide
And tell what you have to tell
You'll see your problems multiplied
If you continually decide
To faithfully pursue
The policy of truth.
Depeche Mode, The Policy of Truth, on VIOLATOR (Sire Records 1990).
93. See supra note 65. This question is not meant to deride attorneys who abide by
the rules of the jurisdictions in which they practice. Rather, the question merely
probes the rationale for those rules.
94. See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAwYERs' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYS-
TEM 51-53 (1975).
95. Il at 52. Freedman illustrated this notion by quoting Dr. Samuel Johnson: "In
response to Boswell's question: 'But what do you think of supporting a cause
which you know to be bad?' Dr. Johnson replied: 'Sir, you do not know it to be
good or bad till the Judge determines it."' FREEDMAN, supra note 94, at 51, quot-
ing 2 J. BoswELL's LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 47 (G.B. Hill ed., 1887)(footnote
omitted)("Thus, Dr. Johnson said: 'A lawyer is not to tell what he knows to be a
lie....' In the same sentence, however, he added: '... . he is not to usurp the
province of the jury and of the Judge and determine what shall be the effect of
evidence...' "). I&i at 53.
96. Although there is wide agreement that in civil cases attorneys should reveal the
perjury of their clients to the court, a great debate exists over whether lawyers
have a similar obligation when representing a criminal defendant. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES Rule 3.3 cmts. 7-10. The perjury issue, however, is beyond the
scope of this essay.
97. Say, for example, that Plaintiff comes to Attorney seeking representation in a
breach of contract case against Defendant. Plaintiff tells Attorney at the outset,
"I breached the contract, but I want to claim that Defendant breached the con-
tract." Because neither a judge nor a jury has held against Plaintiff yet, Attorney
cannot "know" that Plaintiff breached the contract. Attorney therefore has no
rational reason to turn down the representation. Thus, any screening benefits
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an attorney like Lincoln would say that he can "know" with a degree
of moral certainty whether a client was in the wrong, and that justify-
ing continued representation through an overly formalistic theory of
knowledge would be an abdication of moral responsibility.
Although the epistemological justification for role differentiation
is unsatisfying, a second, more widely accepted rationale for role dif-
ferentiation is grounded in the systemic interest in the adversarial
process.98 Our society has chosen the adversarial process as its system
of determining guilt and fault, and a key aspect of that process is hav-
ing equally committed, if not equipped, advocates using every legal
and ethical means of advancing their clients' causes.99 Although an
attorney may decide whether to represent a prospective client based
on whether she believes the client is culpable, once the adversarial
process has begun, society's interest in maintaining the integrity of
that process prevents the attorney from engaging in less than zealous
representation. 100 This understanding of role differentiation under-
lies the current usage of the term "zealous representation." 0 1
that attorneys currently provide would be obliterated under the epistemological
approach, a result that the already overworked judicial system cannot tolerate.
98. See Freedman, supra note 94, at 53.
99. Id. Freedman expressed this point as follows:
There is yet another way, one that I believe is more honest and more
useful, of understanding what is meant when one says that the lawyer
does not know that the client is guilty .... T]he lawyer is told: "You,
personally, may very well know the truth, but your personal knowledge
is irrelevant. In your capacity as an advocate (and, if you will, as an of-
ficer of the court) you are forbidden to act upon your personal knowl-
edge of the truth, as you might want to do as a private person, because
the adversary system could not function properly if lawyers did so."
1d. In representing a client, Freedman wrote, "it is not the role or function of the
advocate to act upon conclusions of ultimate facts such as guilt or innocence.
That function is assigned to the judge or jury, which bases its decision on the
adversaries' presentation of their clients' cases." Id. at 57.
100. See GiLLERs & DORSEN, supra note 86, at 457 (A lawyer "may, of course, reflect
on the rightness of a client's case before accepting it and decline cases she finds
repugnant.... Once she has taken an assignment, she acts as though the client's
cause were her own."). This notion also was articulated compassionately by Lord
Brougham in the Trial of Queen Caroline:
[Ain advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and,
amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing
this duty he must not regard the harm, the torments, the destruction
which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from
that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though
it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821), quoted in FREEDMAN, supra note 82, at 65 (foot-
note omitted).
101. See FREEDMAN, supra note 82, at 65. Freedman noted that lawyers have an "obli-
gation to give 'entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the main-
tenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of [the lawyer's] utmost
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Lincoln's conduct in representing clients he believed were culpable
certainly would violate this modern understanding of zealous advo-
cacy. In his representation of Patterson, Lincoln's belief that Patter-
son was guilty forced Lincoln's honest mind into a series of damaging
admissions during his closing argument.102 In another case, Lincoln
failed to give an enthusiastic closing argument for precisely the same
reason.10 3 Lincoln's marching out of court and discontinuing his rep-
resentation when he discovered a client's dishonesty hardly helped the
client's cause. 104 All of these actions created an uneven playing field
in the courtroom, and judged by today's standards are inconsistent
with the common formulation of zealous advocacy and the adversarial
process.105
To condemn Lincoln's conduct merely because it is inconsistent
with modern standards, however, would be unfair.106 To say that Lin-
coln's conduct was not zealous as zeal is understood today is accurate,
but says nothing of whether there is room in the concept of zealous
advocacy for the type of conduct practiced by Lincoln when he be-
lieved his clients to be culpable. Zeal, after all, is a flexible concept-
learning and ability' ... [which] has been traced back more than a century, and
zealousness continues today to be 'the fundamental principle of the law of lawyer-
ing,' and 'the dominant standard of lawyerly excellence.'" Id (footnotes omit-
ted)(quoting ABA Cannons of Professional Ethics 15 (1908); HAZARD & HODES,
supra note 82, at 17; Report from the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy 1, 4
(vol. v, no. 1, Winter, 1984).
102. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 69-101 and accompanying text.
106. After all, as previously noted, Lincoln had neither the Model Rules nor the Model
Code to serve as his guides. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. In fact, in
1836 Professor David Hoffman of the University of Maryland published for his
students a set of "Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment," in which
Resolution 33 recommends that an attorney's conscience be her "sole guide." See
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSioNAL RESPONSmirry 10 (3d ed. 1992); see also
MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 72, at 280 (noting that Hoffman went so far as
to refuse to plead the Statute of Limitations as a defense when it was the sole
defense available to his client). Hoffman's work greatly influenced likely Profes-
sor and Judge George Sharswood, and Resolution 33 likely inspired Sharswood to
write the following in 1860:
Counsel have an undoubted right, and are in duty bound, to refuse to be
concerned for a plaintiff in the legal pursuit of a demand, which offends
his sense of what is just and right.... [I]t would be on his part an im-
moral act to afford that assistance, when his conscience told him that the
client was aiming to perpetrate a wrong through the means of some ad-
vantage the law may have afforded him.
SHARSWOOD, supra note 65, at 39-40; see also MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 72,
at 280. Thus, Lincoln's courtroom behavior was in accord with the thinking of the
best known commentators of his day; perhaps the time has come for dialogue on
the extent to which the changes the legal profession has undergone since the days
Lincoln practiced law are indeed improvements.
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the conventional notion of zealous advocacy allows attorneys ethically
to choose not to pursue certain legal means of representing their cli-
ents.107 For example, lawyers ethically may accede to adversaries' re-
quests for extensions of time, or may agree to stipulations of fact.108
Thus, the true issue is whether the notion of zeal should be modified
to permit, in some form, the type of representation Lincoln provided
clients he came to believe were guilty or at fault.
B. The Argument for Expanding the Notion of Zealous Advocacy
A very down to earth justification for expanding the the accepted
realm of zealous advocacy is that as an empirical matter, the discovery
of Lincoln's conduct in representing clients he came to believe were
culpable cannot deny his great achievements as an attorney.109 Lin-
coln experienced much success as a direct result of abiding by his strict
moral code. One commentator explained that "[t]o Lincoln's indefati-
gable pursuit of the truth, his candor, and his fidelity to his convictions
can be attributed much of his success at the bar," and that "[w]hen a
case engaged his moral sense, no matter if the law was clearly against
him, his dynamic power of conviction and extraordinary sincerity
often enabled him to overwhelm all the technicalities of the law, win
over both judge and jury, and secure the verdict.""10
107. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.3 cmt. 1.
108. See MODEL CODE DR 7-101(A)(1); MODEL RULEs Rule 1.2 cmt. 1.
109. See infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
110. WOLDMAN, supra note 28, at 184. S.C. Parks concurred:
[Lincoln] was a great advocate and more successful at the Bar than many
men who knew more law than himself.... For this there were two rea-
sons. One was that he was naturally fair minded, and, as a rule, would
not advocate any cause which he did not believe to be just. Owing to this
characteristic he would not knowingly take a case that was wrong, and if
he ignorantly got into such a case he would generally refuse to prosecute
or defend it after he had ascertained his mistake.
Parks, supra note 28, at 25 (ellipses in original). Emanuel Hertz described a simi-
lar incident:
A.H. Chapman has told of one instance in which Lincoln, convinced
of the innocence of his client, relied mainly on one witness to clear him.
The witness told, under oath, what Lincoln knew to be a lie, although no
one else knew it. Lincoln rose when the testimony was concluded.
"Gentlemen," he began, "I depended on this witness to clear my client. I
now ask that no attention be paid to his testimony. Let his words be
stricken out. If my case fails, I do not wish to win it by a falsehood."
His frankness, followed by a magnificent summing up of the merits of
the case, brought a verdict of acquittal.
Hertz, supra note 27. Woldman also revealed a case in which Lincoln's conduct
worked out for the best:
In a case where one of his own witnesses was evasive in his replies on
cross-examination, Lincoln arose, and by permission of the trial judge,
publicly and severely reprimanded the reluctant witness. 'It was a dan-
gerous experiment which might have brought discredit on our most im-
portant witness,' said Anthony Thornton, who was Lincoln's associate in
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This success at winning cases was due not only to Lincoln's skill in
arguing a morally justifiable case, but also to his unwillingness to de-
fend clients he believed to be culpable. S.C. Parks noted that "[o]wing
to this habit of not advocating a bad case he had the advantage of feel-
ing that he ought to gain the cases that he did advocate. He also had
the advantage of having the confidence of the court and jury at the
outset and the fairness and skill to keep it to the close."'' Staying
true to his ideals therefore gave Lincoln a psychological advantage in
defending clients in whose innocence or lack of fault he believed.1 2
As a normative matter, Lincoln's courtroom conduct should not de-
tract from his stature as an attorney. In fact, quite the opposite is true.
It is because of Lincoln's honesty, not despite it, that his peers greatly
respected himn,13 and he is remembered so favorably today, which
demonstrates that Lincoln's ethical system is not mutually exclusive
with success in the practice of law.114 One of Lincoln's colleagues best
summed the pearl in the oyster that was Lincoln's integrity:
It is common to have intellectual power. Webster had that in a marked de-
gree, but he was not intellectually honest, and hence we find him in history
advocating free trade in 1816, and a high tariff in 1836.... That "honesty is the
best policy" was well established in the... greatest of men intellectually and
essentially feeble morally: and in the career and fruitful results of the life of
Abraham Lincoln, as seen in his great mission, its faithful performance and
his immortal fame. A man of the former class, of which, alas! there are too
the case. 'His object, however, was accomplished and the witness an-
swered promptly all questions on cross-examination.'
WoLDmAN, supra note 28, at 183 (footnote omitted).
111. Parks, supra note 27, at 25.
112. Id.
113. As Francis Browne reported:
Judge Sidney Breese, Chief Justice of Illinois [said]: "For my single self,
I have for a quarter of a century regarded MYr. Lincoln as the finest law-
yer I ever knew, and of a professional bearing so high-toned and honora-
ble, as justly, and without derogating from the claims of others, entitling
him to be presented to the profession as a model well worthy of the clos-
est imitation."
BROWNE, supra note 63, at 141. The fact that imitating Lincoln would be consid-
ered unethical by today's standards should give all defenders of the modern no-
tion of zealous advocacy pause.
114. As Hill wrote in explaining Lincoln's conduct in his defense of clients he believed
to be culpable:
These and similar actions have been characterized by one highly re-
spectable authority as "admittedly detracting from Lincoln's character
as a lawyer," but no member of the profession who has the best interests
of his calling at heart will accept such a conclusion. On the contrary, it is
because he had the courage and character to uphold the highest stan-
dards of the law in daily practice that Lincoln is entitled to a place in the
foremost rank of the profession. He lived its ideals and showed them to
be practical, and his example gives inspiration and encouragement to
thousands of practitioners who believe that those things which detract
from the character of the man detract from the character of the lawyer.
HILL, supra note 20, at 240-41.
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many in our history, is equally at home in arguing either in unison with, or
contrary to his convictions; it is simply a little more difficult to argue dishon-
estly than honestly-that is all with him. But it was morally impossible for
Lincoln to argue dishonestly; he could no more do it than he could steal
115
Although building a reputation for honesty similar to Lincoln's may
be more difficult in today's substantially larger cities, shouldn't we al-
low, if not encourage, attorneys to attempt to do so?' 1 6
Some modern commentators have advanced an alternative to the
role differentiation model of zealous advocacy, known as the truth
model, that would allow precisely such attempts.1 1 7 The truth model
holds that a merely legal claim or defense does not necessarily consti-
tute a moral one, and if the attorney determines that the representa-
tion would be immoral, she should refuse to accept or should
terminate the representation.1 18 Lawyers who subscribe to the truth
model accept the adversarial process as important, but subjugate the
interests of a particular client to the overarching values of truth and
integrity.1 19
One reason for the growing support for the notion of truth seeking
in advocacy is the theory of counter-attitudinal advocacy that has de-
veloped from social psychological literature.12O This theory holds that
when a person's beliefs are different from what she must advocate, the
mind may seek to reduce the inner conflict between the two positions
by becoming more favorably disposed to what the person is advocat-
ing.121 This phenomenon can be explained in part by cognitive disso-
115. WHrrNEY, supra note 44, at 239.
116. For an interesting method of engineering a successful adversarial system that
allows for such conduct in representation, see infra notes 155-66 and accompany-
ing text.
117. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 WIs. L. REv. 30, 31.
118. Kathleen S. Bean, A Proposal for the Moral Practice of Law, 12 J. LEGAL PROF.
49, 52 (1987). Kathleen Bean described the model as follows:
At the other end of the spectrum are the lawyers who carry their
personal moral standards for truth and integrity into the practice of law,
and practice law in accordance with that personal code of ethics.... Un-
derlying this view is the assumption that the lawyer will, and should,
recognize that what is legal representation is not always moral represen-
tation. Simply because a client has a legal cause of action or defense does
not mean that the lawyer is bound to assist the client with his or her
cause. In fact, if the ultimate goal is immoral, the moral truth and integ-
rity lawyer is required to refuse assistance to the client. In addition, the
integrity lawyer remains morally accountable for acts committed in the
role of lawyer, just as if the lawyer committed the same act outside of his
or her lawyer role.
Id.
119. Id. at 53.
120. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Lawyers from their Profession. Redefining the
Lawyer's Role 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 31, 32 (1980).
121. Id. See also GiLLERs & DORSEN, supra note 86, at 458 ("For some lawyers, the
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nance theory, which holds that an individual experiencing
inconsistent thought will act to reduce the dissonance. 12 2 Although
the phenomenon makes advocacy easier on the psyche, the attorney's
true beliefs are subjugated to those of the client.' 3 In effect, an attor-
ney may sacrifice part of her identity, and at least her judgment, in
attempting to represent a client.124
An alternative way the mind may reduce cognitive dissonance is by
adopting "an unquestioning acceptance of the duties and responsibili-
ties of one's role."'125 An attorney who adopts this cynical form of role
differentiation performs her role merely because she is a lawyer, with-
out looking for any deeper explanation.2S Such a phenomenon occurs
often with military personnel, following orders because they are
soldiers, without ever thinking to question the morality of the or-
ders.127 The lawyer who adopts this attitude risks, as Postema put it,
"a severe impoverishment of moral experience."'2s Thus, regardless
of whether the mind reacts to cognitive dissonance by adopting the
client's belief or by unquestionably accepting the role, the attorney's
senses of responsibility and judgment are detached from their per-
sonal experience.2 9
risk is not that they will be unable to adopt the advocate's mask, but that they
will be unable to remove it at home.").
122. Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 32. Two other theories that have been advanced
to explain counter-attitudinal advocacy are incentives and behaviorism. See id. at
33-34. The incentive explanation contends that by accepting an advocacy role, an
attorney creates an incentive to answer all opposing points, and if answers are
unavailable, to suppress the points. IL at 33. The behaviorism explanation is
based on self-perceptions; people form beliefs based on their own overt behavior,
and when advocating a position, attorneys may derive their personal beliefs from
that behavior. I&L at 33-34.
123. Or, as less delicately put by Gerald Postema, the lawyer becomes engaged in
"moral prostitution" and "self deception." Postema, supra note 77, at 79.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 75.
126. Id.
127. See Bruce Fein, Dicey Indices at the U.N., WASH. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at D1.
128. Postema, supra note 77, at 78.
129. Id. at 75. In fact, the common conception that professional integrity corresponds
directly with personal integrity compounds this problem:
[S]ince professional integrity is often taken to be the most important
mark of personal integrity, a very likely result is often that a successful
lawyer is one who can strictly identify with this professional strategy of
detachment. That is, the standard conception both directly and indi-
rectly encourages adoption of one or the other of the extreme strategies
of identification. But, as we have seen, both strategies have in common
the unwanted consequence that practical deliberation, judgment, and ac-
tion within the role are effectively cut off from ordinary moral beliefs,
attitudes, feelings, and relationships-resources on which responsible
judgment and action depend. This consequence is very costly in both
personal and social terms.
Id. at 78. One commentator has made the converse argument, contending that
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The costs of this detachment are high indeed. First, and somewhat
ironically, the effects of counter-attitudinal advocacy may actually im-
pair some attorneys' abilities to effectively represent their clients.1 30
Moral arguments certainly have a place in the law, and attorneys who
are distanced from their personal morality have one less arrow they
might draw from their quivers during the course of litigation.131
Additionally, attorneys cut off from their personal morality may be
unable to see the forest for the trees. More practically put, in ethical
close calls lawyers sometimes must shoot from the hip and rely on
their common sense, but the moral detachment counter-attitudinal ad-
vocacy may produce might completely undermine this professional
judgment.132
Third, attorneys' relationships with their clients outside of the
courtroom may suffer because of detachment. 3 3 By leading to adop-
tion of clients' morality or to extreme moral distance, counter-attitudi-
nal advocacy may inhibit attorneys' ability to give personal moral
advice.134 The attorney may become useful only as a hired gun with
the concept of attorney as advisor undermined by the process of advo-
cating a cause contrary to belief.135
Finally, and not unsubstantially, attorneys owe it to themselves to
protect their core beliefs from detachment. Lawyers should be enti-
tled, on issues truly integral to their notions of self, to protect the in-
tegrity of their convictions. After all, we are what we believe (not, as
the saying goes, what we eat), and demanding counter-attitudinal ad-
vocacy not only requires that lawyers act like atuomotons, but that
they actually become automotons.136
lawyers can be zealous advocates without the "benefits" that dissonence provides.
See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV., 1083
(1988).
130. Id- at 79.
131. Id.
132. Id
133. Id- at 80-81.
134. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
135. Postema, supra note 77, at 80-81.
136. As suggested by one commentator:
The consequences of arguing against one's beliefs are so substantial that
a lawyer has every obligation to avoid doing so. A lawyer should not
argue positions which are at odds with views important to him or her-
self.... Each person must decide which beliefs are important enough
that they should not be jeopardized.... Few decisions are as important
as each individual's definition of what kind of person to be. This choice
shapes most of what will be experienced throughout life. One's beliefs
are integral to that self-definition. It should not be arrived at inadver-
tently or by accident. If a lawyer's role is seen as representing any client,
unintended belief changes will alter personal and professional behavior.
Only by making the attorney's obligation to self dominant can it be as-
sured that such choices will be, as much as possible, intentional.
Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 34-35.
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These four interests in attorneys maintaining independence of
moral judgment form a substantial basis on which the truth model
rests. There is, however, another explanation for the defections from
the strict interpretation of zealous advocacy, namely the challenge to
the assumption that the adversarial process is the most reliable
method of dispensing justice.13 7 One commentator noted:
No empirical evidence has demonstrated that [the adversary system] obtains
better results than another type of system. It assumes relative equality of op-
posing counsel. Therefore, it disproportionately favors the wealthy, who can
afford superior representation. In addition, it is a formalistic justification be-
cause it assumes without proof that feeding disputes into its machinery and
procedures will produce just results by rational application of law to fact....
[W]e know that this is not necessarily the case.
Ultimately, there is no proof that the adversary system is the best conceiv-
able, or that it justifies the lawyer's amoral role as expressed in the standard
conception [of the system]. 1 3 8
Other scholars have become similarly disenchanted with the current
state of the adversarial system, 3 9 a dissatisfaction that only heightens
the concern that the harms of counter-attitudinal advocacy may out-
weigh the benefits of the adversarial system as it presently exists.
C. Alternatives to the Current Understanding of Zealous Advocacy
Even if the truth model is theoretically sound, the question re-
mains as to how that model could be utilized to determine a satisfac-
tory level of zeal in the adversarial process? One possible, although
137. See, e.g. Fisher, supra note 86, at 104-05. In fact, the Model Code explicitly states
the assumption:
Our legal system provides for the adjudication of disputes governed
by the rules of substantive, evidentiary, and procedural law. An adver-
sary presentation counters the natural human tendency to judge too
swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known; the
advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation of the facts and
law, enables the tribunal to come to the hearing with an open mind and
to render impartial judgments. The duty of a lawyer to his client and his
duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously
within the bounds of the law.
MODEL CODE EC 7-19 (footnotes omitted).
138. Fisher, supra note 86, at 104-05.
139. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 18 (1980). Frankel wrote:
Because the route of a lawsuit is marked by a running battle all the
way, the outcome is nothing like the assuredly right result imagined in
our dream that "justice will out." In that dream, neither eloquence nor
lawyers' techniques nor cunning has much place. The person who is
"right" should win. But that is very far from assured in the kind of con-
test we've been considering. Where skill and trickery are so much in-
volved, it must inevitably happen that the respective qualities of the
professional champions will make a decisive difference. Where sheer
power and endurance may count, the relative resources of clients be-
come vital.
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extreme, alternative is to eliminate the zealous advocacy requirement
altogether-to "deprofessionalize" attorney's roles.140 This solution,
similar to what one commentator called the "discretionary approach"
to advocacy,141 would require attorneys to be fully responsible for de-
ciding the minimum level of zeal to use in the course of representing
their clients.142 Minimal zeal would be defined by each attorney in
the exercise of their "professional duty of reflexive judgment."143
This alternative, however, is impractical. First, There is some ben-
efit to the adversarial system, namely giving the finder of fact an op-
portunity to hear conflicting sides in a matter.144 Eliminating the
zealous advocacy requirement entirely would allow every attorney, for
any reason, to reduce or abandon efforts to assist their clients, under-
mining the adversarial process.145 Society would have no means of
protecting its interest in the integrity of the judicial system.146
Additionally, potential clients justifiably would be quite nervous
about retaining an attorney. If any attorney, without warning, could
provide less than strenuous representation, why risk retaining an at-
torney at all?47 People likely would attempt to represent themselves,
for they know that they will be zealous in their own defense. Most
such persons, although certainly full of zeal, would lack the technical
skills to survive in a courtroom.148 The inequality between advocates
that admittedly can exist in the present system would be greatly exac-
erbated without any zealous advocacy requirement for attorneys.
Given our societal ambition for justice, an alternative that eliminates
the requirement of zeal is an unacceptable option.
140. See Simon, supra note 129, at 1083 (advocating discretion in ethical decision mak-
ing as a replacement for the categorical rules of codes of professional responsibil-
ity); see also Postema, supra note 77, at 71 (describing but not advocating
deprofessionalization).
141. Simon, supra note 129, at 1090.
142. See Simon, supra note 129, 1092-119 (attorneys should go forth and "seek
justice.").
143. Id. at 1083; see also Postema, supra note 77, at 71.
144. See WOLFRAM, supra note 65, at 581. Wolfram noted, however, that the United
States is the most vigorous of any nation in its zealous advocacy requirement. Id.
145. See Postema, supra note 77, at 81-82. Postema explained:
Deprofessionalization, however, would involve a radical restructuring of
the legal system, reducing the complexity of the law as it currently exists
so that individuals could exercise their rights without the assistance of
highly specialized legal technicians. But, setting aside obvious questions
of feasibility, to discredit this proposal we need only recall that deprofes-
sionalization ignores the significant social value in a division of moral
and social labor produced by the variety of public and professional roles.
I&
146. For a solution to this problem of unfair surprise, see infra notes 155-66.
147. Another commentator similarly criticized Professor Simon's suggestion, noting
that it "leaves too much room for rationalization of self-interest without external
checks on behavior." Fisher, supra note 86, at 108 n.60.
148. See Postema, supra note 77, at 82.
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Another alternative to the current conception of zealous advocacy,
which Gerald Postema has proposed, is the "recourse model" of pro-
fessional responsibilities.149 The recourse model holds that attorneys
must look beyond the explicit duties set forth in codes of professional
responsibility, "carry[ing] out those duties in keeping with the func-
tional objectives of the role."' 5 0 Attorneys must neither adopt the mo-
rality of their clients nor fully distance themselves from their
personal morality,' 5 ' but instead must rely on their judgment to tailor
their conduct to best comply with society's expectations. 52 A lawyer
could, relying on her own moral sensibilities, terminate her relation-
ship with her client because she comes to believe that the client is
culpable.15 3
Although Postema raised and answered a number of objections to
the recourse model,15 4 one difficulty with the theory not addressed in
his article was that it risks collapsing into deprofessionalism. If each
rule of professional conduct is the mere "letter of the law" to be inter-
preted by each attorney according to their own personal morality,
those provisions would cease to be rules at all. The limiting function
of standards of professional conduct would be lost to the subjective
interpretations of lawyers acting as "mini-judges."
A final, and I would contend most desirable, alternative to zeal as
we understand it today is based on an analogy to conflicts of inter-
est.15 5 Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules requires that attorneys "not repre-
sent a client if the representation of that client may be materially
limited... by the lawyer's own interests, unless ... the client consents
after consultation." 5 6 The Model Code contains a similar provision,
requiring that "[e]xcept with the consent of his clients after full disclo-
sure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his pro-
149. Id- at 83.
150. Id-
151. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
152. Postema, supra note 77, at 83.
153. See id at 85:
Thus, in cases in which the Code permits the lawyer to refuse em-
ployment, the rationale seems to be that a lawyer who has scruples about
the client's proposed legal action is not likely to be able adequately to
serve his client. And such scruples generally are not permitted at all
once the attorney agrees to represent a client. This point of view encour-
ages the lawyer to steel himself against such scruples and to view them
as stiictly personal feelings which have no place in professional behav-
ior-a kind of unbecoming moral squeamishness. It is hard to dismiss
the thought that this reaction is at bottom morally cynical.
Id-
154. Those arguments were based on the paternalism of the model, the lack of a need
for a change, and the model's denial of client's autonomy. See i&. at 84-89.
155. For an interesting look at how the logistics of the conflict of interest model would
work, see Bean, supra note 118, at 70-73.
156. MODEL RULES Rule 1.7(b).
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fessional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be
affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal inter-
ests."15 7 Thus, both the Model Rules and Model Code contemplate an
attorney gaining the consent of her prospective clients if the attorney
believes that her personal interests may interfere with the
representation.
Could not this reasoning apply to lawyers who know in advance
that the quality of their representation is likely to suffer if they come
to believe that their clients are culpable?15s Given the psychological
harm attorneys may suffer as a result of counter-attitudinal advocacy,
is it really so far-fetched that some attorneys' interests in protecting
their consciences could rise to the level of conflicts of interest? I
would suggest that it is not far-fetched at all.
The attorney advising her potential client of the possible conflict
could say something to the effect of the following:
I pride myself on my truthfulness and integrity in the practice of law, and I do
not abandon that part of me when I become your advocate. Some attorneys
may be able to represent you effectively regardless of whether they believe
that you were in the right or wrong. I cannot, and my representation may
suffer if I come to believe that you were in the wrong. Although you are al-
ways free to retain other counsel, doing so in the middle of litigation may do
more harm than good. This aspect of my personality is a benefit to me in
representing clients I believe are in the right, but you should be aware that
the opposite can occur before deciding whether you want me as your represen-
tative. Do you understand?1 5 9
Of course, some potential clients may be scared off by this ap-
proach.160 Others, however, may not, and those are the clients attor-
157. MODEL CODE DR 5-101(A). Additionally, EC 2-30 states that "a lawyer should
decline employment if the intensity of his personal feeling, as distinguished from
a community attitude, may impair his effective representation of a prospective
client." MODEL CODE EC 2-30.
158. Constitutional limitations may exist on attorneys appointed to represent criminal
defendants, see MODEL RuLES Rule 3.3 cmt. 12, but these limitations are beyond
the scope of this essay.
159. Some aspects of this conflicts disclaimer were borrowed from Bean, supra note
118, at 72. Bean, however, unlikely would extend the application of the conflicts
model as far as this essay does. See id. at 71 (proposing that the conflict of inter-
est model be limited by what is considered to be adequate representation). I
would suggest that if a client retained an attorney after being made fully aware of
the conflict and insisted that the lawyer continue the representation even after
she had formed a belief that the client is culpable, the client has waived adequate
representation insofar as the representation is affected by the conflict.
160. See id. Worth noting is that even under the conflict of interest approach, rules of
professional conduct still would protect clients who are candid with their pro-
spective attorneys from the beginning of representaiton. If a client honestly in-
forms her attorney that her case is a "bad" one (and says why), and if the lawyer
accepts the representaiton, the attorney must try her best to prevail. It is only
when clients are dishonest, whether through direct deceit or sins of omission,
that attorneys are forced to decide whether to uphold their personal ethical stan-
dards at the expense of their clients' interests. The conflicts model allows the
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neys subscribing to the truth model seek to represent in the first
place.
In fact, the conflicts model best parallels Lincoln's situation.
Athough there is no record of Lincoln warning potential clients of his
ineffectiveness in representing those he came to believe were culpa-
ble, Lincoln's repuatation for honesty was known across Illinois at the
time he practiced law.1 6 1 Those who sought to retain Lincoln as their
counsel certainly were familiar with his style of representation, and
were more than willing to take the risk that Lincoln might begin to
doubt their innocence or lack of fault. Lincoln's clients did not for-
mally waive the conflict in the manner discussed here, but the similar-
ity to the conflicts model is notable nevertheless.
This conflict of interests approach, practiced more explicitly but
nonetheless similarly to Lincoln's style of representation, has several
benefits. First, it eliminates the possibility of unfair surprise. 62 Some
potential clients who seek a "role differentiation zealous advocacy"
lawyer today may unknowingly retain an attorney who subscribes to
the truth model of advocacy.163 The way the Model Rules and Model
Code currently are understood, the client in such a situation may be
dissatisfied greatly with her counsel's representation, and the attorney
may be faced with disciplinary action by the Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Committee. Under the conflicts approach, however,
attorneys fully would inform potential clients at the outset of the pos-
sible conflict, and clients either would consent to the possible conflict
or would seek different counsel.
Another benefit of the conflicts approach is the moral comfort pro-
vided to truth model attorneys. Today, attorneys inclined to accept
the truth model must either engage in counter-attitudinal advocacy,
with its corresponding risks,164 or face the shame and risk involved in
violating accepted norms of professional conduct.165 By accepting the
truth model in conjunction with informing potential clients of the pos-
sible conflict as an acceptable form of zealous advocacy, truth model
attorneys would be freed emotionally to practice their brand of advo-
cacy unaccompanied by the stresses of the current system.
The conflicts approach likely would provide a final benefit, namely
potentially dishonest client to make an informed choice regarding whether to
fully inform her attorney, and the client who chooses to misinform her attorney
after being warned of the potential conflict in doing so waives inadequate
representaiton arising from the conflict. Thus, the conflicts approach protects,
without overprotecting, the interests of potentially dishones clients, while not af-
fecting clients who fully inform their attorneys at the outset.
161. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
162. See Bean, supra note 118, at 70.
163. Id-
164. See supra notes 120-29 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs Rule 8.4
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increased satisfaction with attorneys from the public at large. It is no
secret that attorneys today suffer from a negative public image, a fact
due largely to the impression that attorneys are almost by definition
dishonest.166 Although the profession need not foist the truth model
of advocacy upon every attorney (nor should it-there should be room
in the legal profession for both those comfortable with the status quo
and those who subscribe to the truth model), public perceptions of
lawyers may improve significantly if attorneys at least are provided a
means of practicing law in accordance with their consciences.
IV. CONCLUSION
Should lawyers be required to compromise their ethical principles
to practice law? Many jokingly have commented that attorneys' pro-
fessional responsibility is an oxymoron, but that surely is an unfair
generalization.167 One commentator noted that "[a]s long as there has
been an adversary system, there has been dispute regarding advocates'
conflicting loyalties to their clients and to the public ... ,"168 Left out
of this calculus, however, has been attorney's loyalties to themselves,
or more specifically, to their consciences. As a result of the rigid no-
166. A humorous flier entitled "Attorney Season and Bag Limits" has come to the
attention of this author. The flier, which notes in provision one that "[a]ny per-
son with a valid State of Illinois Hunting License may harvest attorneys," goes on
to list the bag limits for different types of attorneys. Tellingly, the category
"Honest Attorney" is listed as "EXTINCT." See generally Shulamith Gold, Law-
yer Bashing? Objection! Evidence Mounts that Attorneys are Being Targeted as
Never Before, CHI. TRI., July 23, 1993, § 2, at 1-2 (one of the ten most common
stereotypes of lawyers, according to lawyers, is that "[t]hey're hired guns who
represent scum. 'Lawyers operate in their own moral universe, and a lot of peo-
ple don't like or understand it,' said Wendy Kaminer, a lawyer .
167. As one commentator suggested:
To suggest that inflexible integrity is indispensable to the make-up of
a great lawyer is, of course, to challenge the sneer or the smile of the
cynically minded. The jests about honest lawyers have become classic,
and they will forever continue to delight. Yet, despite the humorist and
the cynic, there is probably no profession in the world which makes
greater demands upon integrity, or presents nicer questions of honor, or
offers wider opportunities for fairness, than the profession of the law.
The fact that many distinguished practitioners have not maintained the
highest standards of the calling, that most of them have compromised for
monetary or momentary success, that a few have actually abused their
great opportunities, does not in the least impeach the proposition that
extraordinary integrity, honor, and fairness are the essential qualities of
a great lawyer. It merely demonstrates how rare great lawyers are.
HILL, supra note 20, at 31-32.
168. Edwin H. Greenbaum, Attorneys' Problems in Making Ethical Decisions, 52 IND.
L.J. 627, 627 (1977). This essay does not suggest that lawyers who have resolved
this conflict in favor of role differentiation are morally bankrupt. In fact, quite
the opposite is true-they have found a way to represent their clients within the
currently accepted scope of professional conduct. Attorneys who favor the truth
model, however, should be no less free to engage in the practice of law.
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tion of zealous advocacy found in the Model Code and Model Rules,
much dissatisfaction with lawyers exists both inside and outside of the
profession.169 In fact, if 160 years ago Abraham Lincoln would have
been held to today's standard of zealous advocacy, Honest Abe's con-
science may have prevented him from becoming an attorney. Let us
hope that our profession can remove its eyes from the hypnotic allure
of the adversarial process, if only briefly, to consider providing some
latitude to those aspiring to Lincoln's high ideals.
169. See FRAKEL, supra note 145, at 3-4; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future
of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991).
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